Never Lost Again: Closing the Gaps in Transoceanic Flight Tracking After MH370

    On March 7, 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 (MH370), a Boeing 777-200ER, disappeared enroute from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing with 239 passengers and crew on board (Wikipedia, 2025). Aside from isolated scraps of wreckage, the aircraft, crew, and passengers have never been recovered. It remains the greatest aviation mystery of modern times. This post references some excellent sources where the reader can review the complete account and a detailed timeline of what took place. The timeline documents some disturbing events. Particularly unsettling is a deviation (in fact, a hard left turn) from the planned flight route, just before MH370 entered Vietnamese airspace after 1 a.m. local time. It appears to be a deliberate act. Others would follow. Although insufficient to remove all doubt, it’s safe to say that this and other available evidence does not rule out mass murder perpetrated by the pilots and sadly, it wouldn’t be the first time in aviation history. Whatever the cause of MH370’s disappearance, results of a remarkable analysis points to the final resting place of MH370, in an area of the inhospitable Southern Indian Ocean off the western coast of Australia.

    MH370 is not just a tragedy. It’s 239 tragedies. A hidden dimension is that on this transoceanic flight, at the moment the passengers realized something was terribly wrong, they had no means of quickly reporting the situation to their loved ones or the authorities before disaster struck.  On the other hand, the authorities lacked systems for accurate, reliable telemetry from the aircraft to assess the nature of the emergency. The flight data and cockpit voice recorders are sealed within the aircraft fuselage, inaccessible during flight. Between departure and landing, solutions are now available to improve our ability to track and directly communicate with passengers on transoceanic flights during emergencies. In recounting the science behind the search, this post explores those solutions and how the legacy of MH370 may help break down the barriers to adopting them.

    At the time of its disappearance, the MH370 Boeing 777-200ER pictured below had myriad radio transmitters for communicating, navigating, and sensing the flight environment.

 

Figure 1: The Boeing 777-200ER Aircraft (Tail Number 9M-MRO) Used for Flight MH370 (Source: Kentaro Lemoto from Tokyo, Japan, CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons)

Table 1 MH370’s Likely Installed Radio Frequency Transmitters

System

Frequency

Description

Aircraft Communications and Addressing Reporting System (ACARS)

VHF (118-136 MHz) and Inmarsat (see below)

Delivery of flight data, including status of on-board systems, altitude, heading, speed, and position, to other aircraft and ground systems

ATC Radios

VHF (118-136 MHz) within line of sight,

HF (2.8–22 MHz) beyond VHF range

Cockpit voice and data communications with air traffic control (ATC)

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)

1090 MHz

Reports aircraft flight data to ground and airborne receivers; Note: Aireon began providing ADS-B service through Iridium NEXT satellites four years after the MH370 disaster

Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)

960–1215 MHz

Navigation aid that measures the aircraft’s distance from a ground station

Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs)

121.5 MHz and 406 MHz

Broadcasts a beacon in the event of a crash

Inmarsat Classic Aero Service

L-band (1.5–1.6 GHz for uplink and 1.6–1.7 GHz for downlink)

A commercial satellite communication (satcom) service from Inmarsat used for Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS) phone and data communications (including ACARS) by and transoceanic flights and ships at sea

Radio Altimeter

4.2 – 4.4 GHz

A type of radar that measures height above ground level at low altitudes

Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Transponder with Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Interrogation: 1030 MHz

Response: 1090 MHz

Reports aircraft position, altitude, and identification when interrogated by ATC radar; TCAS interrogates nearby aircraft transponders for collision avoidance

X-Band Weather Radar

8-12 GHz

Detects turbulence and bad weather ahead of the aircraft

Source: ChatGPT, based on the known systems installed on Boeing 777-200ER aircraft and publicly available information, 2024.

In one of the many mysteries of MH370, the key systems in the table above that allow authorities to track the aircraft went offline a short time into the flight. ACARS messaging was disabled at 01:06 Malaysia Standard Time (MYT), approximately one hour after takeoff (Pultarova, 2014). The SSR transponder and ADS-B systems went offline at 01:21 MYT, shortly after the last cockpit voice communication (Wikipedia, 2015). If Captain Zaharie Ahmad Shah turned off these systems intending to make the aircraft untraceable outside of radar coverage, he overlooked an important detail.  A satellite data unit (SDU) installed onboard the aircraft continuously communicates with the Inmarsat Classic Aero Service while it is connected to a power source. SDU messages would prove to be critical to the investigation.

    Records show that MH370’s SDU transmitted a network logon request to the Inmarsat network at midnight MYT, approximately thirty minutes prior to departing Kuala Lumpur (Wikipedia, 2015). In nominal operation, an Inmarsat Classic Aero logon request is received by Inmarsat satellites overhead and downlinked to a regional network ground earth station (GES) where it is validated. In this case, the GES was a site in Perth, Australia. Upon successful login, the satellite relays an acknowledgement to the aircraft, and ATC or the airline’s operations center can place calls to it through the network. If the session is dormant for longer than one hour, the network will exchange periodic logon interrogation (LOI) messages or “pings” to verify the SDU’s active session status (Wikipedia, 2015). After the initial logon, MH370 communicated with the Inmarsat network according to the timetable below. In summary, the SDU communication log gave investigators a timeline of the flight that presumably ended in a crash

Table 2 Log of MH370 SDU Messages Exchanged with Inmarsat Network (Wikipedia, 2015)

Time (MYT)

Message

00:41

Seventeen ACARS messages exchanged prior to leaving the ground, and three more prior to 01:07 MYT

01:07

Final ACARS message sent, last secondary radar contact with MH370, satellite link goes down, possibly after an SDU power outage

02:03

Ping from the network to MH370 goes unacknowledged

02:05

Second ping from the network to MH370 goes unacknowledged

02:25

MH370 SDU logs onto the Inmarsat network

02:39

Ground to aircraft phone call acknowledged, unanswered

03:41

Ping acknowledged

04:41

Ping acknowledged

05:41

Ping acknowledged

06:41

Ping acknowledged

07:14

Ground to aircraft phone call acknowledged, unanswered

08:11

Ping acknowledged

08:19

MH370 SDU logs onto the Inmarsat network after the aircraft’s fuel is exhausted, auxiliary power unit (APU) deploys, and power is restored

09:15

Ping unacknowledged

on land or ditching in open water. Given the range and cruising speed of the Boeing 777 at altitude, the potential search area was enormous. Fortunately, there was additional information available that would help narrow the search.

    More than a year after MH370 disappeared, in June 2014, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) released an investigative report (Zweck, 2015). It describes a collaboration between government-appointed aviation experts and Inmarsat engineers called the Satellite Working Group (SWG). With help from Inmarsat, SWG was able to pair the SDU log data with two more pieces of network telemetry that Inmarsat added in the wake of the Air France 447 crash in the Atlantic in 2009: Burst Timing Offset (BTO), and Burst Frequency Offset (BFO). SWG applied the BTO/BFO-enhanced telemetry to build models of MH370’s flight path that reduced the search area.  In 2015, John Zweck of the University of Texas at Dallas published an exceptional tutorial that explains the models in exquisite detail, starting with a model based on BTO.

    BTO represents the round-trip time between initializing a ping at the GES in Perth to receiving an acknowledgement from the aircraft through the satellite relay (Zweck, 2015). Subtracting the time consumed in processing the ping at the ground station, within the aircraft SDU, and onboard the satellite, leaves the time it took the ping signal to travel to the aircraft and back to the satellite. Dividing this time in half and multiplying it by the speed of light yields the distance from the aircraft to the satellite. This distance is denoted by DSA in the figure below. For an aircraft whose location on the earth is unknown, the locus of possible locations, assuming a constant altitude, forms a great circle on the

 

Figure 2: Geospatial relationship between satellite and aircraft (Zweck, 2015)

earth, the location of which is defined by an angle Phi measured from the center of the earth. Here, the earth is assumed to be a perfect sphere. The great circle comprises all points on the sphere that are a distance DSA from the satellite. Our knowledge of the last known position and heading of MH370 from radar information, combined with the nominal cruising speed of the Boeing 777-200ER at altitude (Zweck cites 905 km/hour at 35,000 ft), precludes the portion of the great circle that is on the opposite side of the planet, and reduces it to one of a family of ping arcs featured in news reports of the disaster investigation. Each BTO telemetry point generates a separate ping arc. Zweck introduces a Concatenation of Geodesics Model with a so-called ping arc equation enforcing the condition that given a known starting point and constant altitude and velocity, MH370 must cross each ping arc at the time corresponding to each BTO telemetry point. The equation’s derivation is too long to restate here, and the reader is encouraged to review Zweck’s paper for details. Suffice it to say, the model stitches together the aircraft’s course by joining (concatenating) angles Phi(n) that connect the BTO telemetry points on each ping arc. Sources of uncertainty in the Concatenation of Geodesics Model are three-fold: aircraft speed, altitude, and the angle to the next ping arc BTO telemetry point, Phi(n+1), where n is an index. In addition, the model does not consider BFO telemetry. Because of this, it cannot resolve an ambiguity in MH370’s heading. In other words, the heading angle is the argument of a trigonometric function that has two solutions, depending on its sign (positive or negative). Heading ambiguity early in the investigation fueled media conspiracy theories. In the 2023 Netflix documentary MH370: The Plane that Disappeared, aviation journalist Jeff Wise describes how he embraces the theory that MH370 fell victim to an elaborate Russian hijacking plot and travelled north along the ping arcs to a clandestine landing in Central Asia. Intriguing, but false, as the next section will show.

    BFO is the difference between the frequency of the ping radio signal that the GES transmits, and the frequency of the acknowledgement that the aircraft returns through the satellite. BFO is caused, in part, by the Doppler shift of radio signals from the aircraft moving relative to the satellite platform. Fundamentally, Doppler shift dFUP at BFO telemetry point n is expressed as:

 


(1) 

where c is the speed of light, Rsat is the distance of the satellite from the center of the earth, f is the frequency of the signal transmitted by the aircraft, and vao is the component of the aircraft’s velocity orthogonal to the vector of its position on the ping arc (Zweck, 2015). If SWG had a set of direct, accurate measurements of dFUP then, as the equation shows, they could reliably solve for the actual distance between MH370 and the satellite. But they didn’t. They only had BFO data where the distance is biased by more than one source of uncertainty. We will discuss three of them. The following graphic illustrates the components of BFO telemetry. BFO is the sum of these components, reduced by the 

Figure 3: Graphic of Burst Frequency Offset (BFO) Contributing Factors in the Investigation of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (Source: AHeneen, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en, via Wikimedia Commons)

Doppler shift compensation in the SDU and the satellite. However, the compensation is imperfect because it’s based on an idealization of the satellite’s orbit.  In considering BFO, SWG had to account for the actual orbit of the Inmarsat satellite, which means understanding the difference between geostationary and geosynchronous orbit. Doppler shift compensation in the SDU is based on a geostationary orbit. It’s a theoretical orbit where the satellite remains stationary above the equator and moves in perfect tempo with the earth, i.e., zero relative velocity. The actual orbit is geosynchronous, where the satellite returns to the same point in the sky at the same time, every day. This is because the earth is an oblate spheroid, slightly flattened at the poles and bulging at the equator due to the relentless tug of the moon’s gravity.  This causes the plane of the orbit to tilt slightly away from the equator. Consequently, the projection of the geosynchronous orbit on the surface of the earth is not a point, but, in this case, a teardrop-shaped curve known as an analemma (Zweck, 2015). This leads to errors in the SDU Doppler compensation and a non-zero BFO.  The figure also depicts fbias, the time-independent frequency shift associated with the fixed error in the aircraft and satellite transceiver oscillators. This is the second major source of BFO uncertainty. Zweck reports the error at ±5 Hz. The third source of uncertainty is the most concerning, as it relates to the fundamental integrity of MH370 BFO telemetry. Zweck notes “large fluctuations in the BFO data” for the period between the last secondary radar contact with MH370 and receipt of the ping acknowledgement near 03:41 MYT. The fluctuations caused SWG to set the starting point for the flight path model that includes BFO data as the location of MH370 at 03:41 MYT. SWG guessed that location by extrapolating from the point of last secondary radar contact, based on the range of plausible aircraft altitude, speed, and heading. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the guess causes an uncertainty in MH370’s position at 03:41 MYT of ±28 degrees in heading and ±9 degrees in latitude (Wikipedia, 2015). This background sets the stage for Zweck’s modified Concatenation of Geodesics model.

    Zweck’s modified Concatenation of Geodesics model begins with the same family of ping arcs. MH370’s speed on each ping arc is constant, but in this model, the speed is initially unknown (Zweck, 2015). The model solves a system of four equations in two variables, the aircraft’s velocity at the current ping arc, and its angular position Phi(n+1) at the next ping arc. Anyone who took Algebra in school may remember that only two equations are necessary to find two unknowns. Zweck over constrains the problem to yield agreement in the results in all cases. The model equations enforce the following conditions. First, like before, the aircraft reaches the next ping arc at the time corresponding to the BTO telemetry point. Second, the aircraft leaves the current ping arc and arrives at the next one with the Doppler shift calculated from the BFO at the BTO telemetry points of each arc. To better understand the model concept, consider the spherical coordinate system illustrated below. In this system, a body’s position is exactly defined by three parameters: radius R, elevation angle Phi, and 

 

Figure 4: A Spherical Coordinate System

azimuth angle Theta. Zweck defines a moving coordinate frame for the aircraft and the satellite in the spherical coordinate system. Next, he derives the following equation that compares the Doppler shift dFUP from the BFO telemetry point on the current ping arc to a new analytical expression for the Doppler shift between the aircraft and the satellite that is moving counterclockwise relative to the center of the earth along the teardrop-shaped orbit discussed earlier:


(2)

where Rsat(n) is the distance of the satellite from the center of the earth at telemetry point n, RA is the constant distance of the aircraft from the center of the earth, and vsat(n) is the satellite’s velocity orthogonal to the position vector Rsat(n). Examining (2) reveals that dFUP is dependent on elevation angle Phi(n) and azimuth angle Theta(n). This eliminates the ambiguity in MH370’s heading in the first model. Computing this modified Concatenation of Geodesics model with the satellite orbit propagating counterclockwise reveals that MH370 was indeed headed south. 

    As an epilogue to the story, the SWG’s analysis, as explained by Zweck, wasn’t enough to locate the wreckage of MH370 in the Southern Indian Ocean by January 2018 (Wikipedia, 2025). Since then, Kadri presented strong evidence that the pressure wave from the impact of MH370 with the ocean surface was received by the hydroacoustic senor array at the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) monitoring station at Cape Leeuwin, Australia (Kadri, 2024). Unfortunately, the data was insufficient to pinpoint the impact (Frost, 2024). Inmarsat showed astounding forethought in adding BTO and BFO telemetry to the Classic Aero Service in 2009, but there is more that must be done to ensure that if an MH370 disaster happens again, the victims can be located quickly. This is explored in the next section, beginning with a closer look at the Inmarsat satellite constellation.

    The Inmarsat Classic Aero Service uplink from MH370 was relayed to the GES in Perth by Inmarsat-3 F1. Launched in 1996 (Krebs G. D., 2023), it was, at the time of the disaster, in geosynchronous orbit near the equator, at an altitude of approximately 35,786 km above earth’s surface at 64.5 degrees east longitude (Zweck, 2015). The following is a table of all active Inmarsat satellites equipped for the Classic Aero Service in March 2014. According to SatBeams, in March 2014, Inmarsat-4 F2 was online 

Table 3: Active Inmarsat Satellites with L-Band Classic Aero Service as of March 2014 (Wikipedia, n.d.)

Satellite

Location/Longitude (Degrees)

Reference

Inmarsat-2 F2

Western Pacific Ocean/98W

(SatBeams, 2020)

Inmarsat-3 F1

Indian Ocean/64.5E

(Zweck, 2015)

Inmarsat-3 F2

Atlantic Ocean/55.4W

(SatBeams, 2020)

Inmarsat-3 F3

Western Pacific Ocean/110W

(SatBeams, 2020)

Inmarsat-3 F4

Atlantic Ocean/54W

(SatBeams, 2020)

Inmarsat-3 F5

Atlantic Ocean/54W

(SatBeams, 2020)

Inmarsat-4 F1

Central Pacific Ocean/178.2E

(SatBeams, 2020)

Inmarsat-4 F2

Eastern Pacific Ocean/143.44E

(N2YO, n.d.)

Inmarsat-4 F3

Western Atlantic Ocean/97.65W

(Wikipedia, 2023)

Inmarsat-4A F4 (Alphasat I-XL)

Central Africa/25E

(Krebs G. D., 2024)

    

over the Eastern Pacific Ocean at 143.44 degrees east longitude. Launched in 2005, its L-band antenna, at the time, was capable of projecting over 200 narrow radio spot beams and 19 wide spot beams on the earth (SatBeams, 2020). The figure on the left, below, illustrates the Inmarsat-4 F2 Regional Spot Beam Number 18. On the right is a coverage map of Inmarsat-3 F1. A comparison reveals that the beams

 

                                                (a)                                                                               

                                            (b)

Figure 5: (a) Inmarsat-4 F2 Regional Spot Beam Number 18 (SatBeams, 2020), (b) Inmarsat-3 F1 Regional L-Band Coverage Map (Sky Brokers, 2021)

clearly overlap in the region of MH370’s last radar contact. It’s therefore plausible that at the time, the Classic Aero Service logon request from MH370’s SDU was received and processed by both satellites. The lack of any Inmarsat telemetry from other satellites suggests that the network is configured to prioritize the uplink with the greatest margin and drop the others. Hence, the only available telemetry was from Inmarsat-3 F1. With BTO and BFO telemetry from both satellites, a means of accurately and unambiguously geolocating MH370 at each ping time would have been possible.

    The technique of geolocating a moving radio emitter with two or more receivers stems from the Long-Range Navigation (LORAN) system, first developed in the early days of World War II (Wikipedia, 2024). LORAN is based on the principle of Pulsed Hyperbolic Radio Navigation, illustrated below. Imagine an aircraft with a LORAN receiver flying in a region bordered by a pair of radio

 

Figure 6: Basic Hyperbolic Navigation Diagram (Source: Keith Tyler at English Wikipedia, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)

towers, a primary and a secondary (A and B in (a), above). The aircraft’s pilots know the distance between the towers. The primary tower broadcasts a sequence of navigation pulses at a known pulse duration and frequency. Upon receiving the primary tower’s pulse sequence, the secondary broadcasts its own sequence after a short processing delay, the magnitude of which is stored in the aircraft’s receiver. The aircraft receives the pulse sequences from each tower and measures the time delay between each pair of primary and secondary tower pulses in the sequence. This is known as the Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA). TDOA is proportional, by the speed of light, to the difference in the aircraft’s distance from each tower. The difference can occur at an infinite number of locations between the towers. For instance, if the calculated difference is 100 km, the aircraft could be 50 km from each tower, or 25 km from one tower and 75 km from the other, and so on. The locus of constant difference (100 km in this example) forms a hyperbola called an isochrone that extends above and below a straight baseline between the towers, as shown above. Measure a different TDOA, and another hyperbola results, some distance from the first one. This leads to a pattern of hyperbolae centered on the baseline, as shown. If the aircraft repeats the process with a different pair created by a third tower, the two sets of hyperbolae will intersect. The hyperbola that the aircraft is currently flying on (which is known from the TDOA measurement and the tower pulse sequence information) intersects with the hyperbola from the measurement with the different pair of towers. The hyperbolae intersect in two places, showing two points where the aircraft could be located. Like the ping arcs discussed above, one possible location can be eliminated with information from a navigation map, or another source. Recall from the discussion of Zweck’s models above that because the aircraft is moving relative to the towers, there is a Doppler shift in the frequency of the pulse sequences that it receives. This allows the aircraft receiver to measure the Frequency Difference of Arrival (FDOA) in addition to the TDOA. FDOA measurements result in sets of ellipsoidal curves known as “isodops.” They overlay hyperbolic isochrones at roughly right angles, thereby improving emitter geolocation accuracy. Had the SDU signals from MH370 been received by Inmarsat-3 F1 and Inmarsat-4 F2, SWG could have geolocated the aircraft using this process with the roles reversed. The Inmarsat satellites are the receivers, MH370 is broadcasting pulses, and all platforms are moving. The technique for geolocating an emitter when all platforms are moving was perfected in the early 1970s. The key is applying the Cross Ambiguity Function (CAF), a generalization of a cross-correlation technique, to calculate the TDOA and FDOA at any time with moving receivers (Stein, 2018). With CAF-based geolocation, the closer isochrones and isodops are to each other, the less the uncertainty in the position of the emitter. If MH370 was hypothetically moving along the baseline between the two receiving satellites, a TDOA error of 1 microsecond implies a position uncertainty of 150 m  (Stein, 2018). FDOA is related to the rate of change in TDOA by the center frequency of the received signal.  Pinpointing the center frequency involves centroiding (Stein, 2018). Geolocation accuracy suffers if the estimate has uncertainty greater than 1 kHz for a center frequency of 10 GHz. The problem is more challenging for lower frequency signals. For the sake of this argument, it’s helpful to assume that the uncertainty of TDOA/FDOA measurements is on par with that of the BTO/BFO and instead consider how this technique may have removed some of the guesswork from the SWG’s analysis. This brings us back to SWG’s decision to start modeling MH370’s flight path from the BTO/BFO telemetry received at 03:41 MYT. SWG was forced to guess the position of MH370 somewhere along an expansive ping arc, which introduced a very large uncertainty in the starting point of the flight path model. Alternatively, if MH370 was geolocated at 03:41 MYT with TDOA and FDOA data from Inmarsat-3 F1 and Inmarsat-4 F2, there would be no guessing. MH370’s location would be measured with high confidence.  

    In closing, for passengers to board future transoceanic flights with confidence that they’ll never be lost again, there are near-term opportunities and barriers. Two technologies are emerging that present opportunities. The first is Direct to Device (D2D) satellite communications. The second is Black Box Telemetry Streaming via satellite. Both are poised to enter service, but regulatory barriers persist.

    Today, there is a high tide of activity in the market for D2D services from low earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations. In April 2023, AT&T announced a successful call with an unmodified cell phone using the AST SpaceMobile network (Engebretson, 2023). Other entrants include Lynk, OmniSpace, and Amazon’s Project Kuiper. They offer a range of D2D products, from 4G and 5G/LTE voice, to text messaging and low-speed data services (Ottolini, 2024). The market leader is SpaceX Starlink. With its partner T-Mobile, they have already launched D2D text messaging in the U.S. and will add voice, data, and Internet of Things products this year. The first question to answer for passengers on transoceanic flights is: Can a passenger with a standard cell phone on board a commercial airliner like the Boeing 777-200, cruising over open ocean at 33,000 feet, close a D2D link with Starlink satellites in LEO? It’s relevant because the aircraft fuselage acts as a Faraday cage, a capsule of conductive material that blocks radio waves. To manage this, a D2D implementation for aircraft would involve a base station receiver incorporated in the fuselage, like the present-day configuration for in-flight wi-fi and entertainment systems. Think of the base station as a cell tower sitting on the outer fuselage. We can envision a future MH370 scenario where the pilots, in their plot to disappear, deactivate the base station. In a 2008 IEEE journal paper, Hurst and Ellingson measured the attenuation of radio waves transmitted from inside the cabins of various commercial airliners (Hurst, 2008). They found that signals pass through the cabin windows.  Signal attenuation varies with the number of passengers onboard. For the MH370 aircraft, the Boeing 777-200 series, with 239 passengers onboard (about half capacity) they measured a path loss of approximately 18 decibels. These parameters are part of the D2D satellite communication link budget excerpt below. Other parameters, including details of the Starlink satellite

Table 4: Link Budget Excerpt for a Cell Phone on Board a B777-200 to a Starlink Satellite

Parameter

Value

Units

Comments

Phone Output Power

-6.99

dBW

 

Phone Antenna Gain

2.00

dBi

Source: ChatGPT, most cell phone antennas have modest gain between 0dBi to +2dBi.

Phone Antenna Losses

-0.50

dB

Typical for consumer RF electronics

Phone EIRP

-5.49

dBW

Phone’s equivalent isotropic radiated power after adding the antenna gain and losses to the output power. According to ChatGPT, cell phones generally transmit at power ranging from 0.1 mW to 200 mW. -5.49 dBW is about 180 mW.

Path Loss

-158.0

dB

This is the attenuation that occurs when the signal travels 993 km to a Starlink satellite that is 30 degrees above the horizon, 550 km above the earth. It’s a function of the signal frequency, 1.9 GHz, which is T-Mobile’s mid-band spectrum used for Starlink (Source: https://www.androidauthority.com/t-mobile-starlink-satellite-connectivity-3207661/).  

B777-200 Cabin & Window Losses

-18.00

dB

Source: Hurst, 2008.

Polarization & Antenna Pointing Losses

-0.35

dB

 

Received Power

-181.8

dBW

This is the signal strength at the Starlink receiver after adding the losses to the phone EIRP.

antenna, receiver, and signal processing, are left out for brevity. With the received power listed above, the budget shows that passengers can successfully connect to Starlink in these conditions, albeit at a low data rate, about 150 kilobits per second. As a result, practical communication in most conditions would be limited to text messaging. Although the technology permits passengers on future transoceanic flights to send D2D text messages in an emergency, the current airline policy does not. The long-standing claim is that cellular telephony interferes with aircraft communications. Note that this has never been definitively proven. Despite this, paragraph (b)(5) of 14 CFR 91.21 authorizes the airlines to restrict cell phone use at their discretion (Wikipedia, 2014). Today, the Federal Communications Commission prohibits cell phone use on commercial flights for a different reason. As continental flights pass over various cell towers, cellular transmissions from the plane can interfere with service on the ground, allegedly by disrupting the schedule of frequency re-use.  Obviously, this is not a concern when flying over open water. Perhaps the legacy of MH370 will be an exemption for D2D cell phone use on transoceanic flights.

    The prospect of geolocating wayward aircraft with TDOA and FDOA measurements from two or more Inmarsat satellites was discussed previously. In the aftermath of MH370, Inmarsat has been working on another improvement. Two months after MH370’s disappearance, Inmarsat proposed a new application of the successor to the Classic Aero Service, Swift Broadband (Stupples, 2014). Stupples describes the application as an emergency mode that streams data from the aircraft cockpit voice and flight data recorders through the Inmarsat network. An emergency may be triggered by events such as a large, unjustified change in heading. The timing of Inmarsat’s announcement was significant. It was an attempt to influence International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulators in the days leading up to a meeting to discuss the MH370 disaster. In addition to this, we can brainstorm other emergency functions, such as activating ACARS and ADS-B in a mode that can’t be turned off by the pilots. Stupples cautions that emergency streaming of black box data poses certain privacy concerns as pilots may not be particularly keen on the prospect of their superiors possibly eavesdropping on them. There is also the counterpoint that pilots must be able to shut down any electrical system if there is a risk of fire onboard. ICAO, the FAA, and other governing bodies must carefully weigh these risks with the potential benefits. The greatest benefit is giving the families of future victims the closure they deserve. From this point of view, regulators have a responsibility to take meaningful steps to prevent another MH370 and, if it cannot, remove the roadblocks to effectively locating and tracking transoceanic flights in an emergency.   

Author’s Note: The author is grateful to G.E. Cameron for his contribution to this post.

References

Brokers, S. (2024). Inmarsat-4 F2 at 64° East. Retrieved from Sky Brokers: https://sky-brokers.com/satellite/inmarsat-4-f2-at-64-east/

Engebretson, J. (2023, April 25). A Whole New Market? AT&T Demos Satellite Connectivity with an Unmodified Cell Phone. Retrieved from telecompetitor: https://www.telecompetitor.com/a-whole-new-market-att-demos-satellite-connectivity-with-an-unmodified-cellphone/

Frost, E. (2024, 6 14). New Underwater Sound Signals May Finally Solve the MH370 Mystery. Retrieved from Sciinsider: https://sciinsider.com/2024/06/14/new-underwater-sound-signals-may-finally-solve-the-mh370-mystery/

Hurst, K. a. (2008, 8). Path Loss From a Transmitter Inside an Aircraft Cabin to an Exterior Fuselage-Mounted Antenna. IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, 50(3).

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